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Comment Hiro Ito
Before the 1990s, bank mergers were hardly seen in Japan except for a very
few cases of rescue mergers. Even those rare mergers were initiated by the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) with help of keiretsu-related companies and
banks of the rescued bank. At present, bank merger is no longer uncom-
mon in Japan. In retrospect, two events led to a signiﬁcant increase in bank
mergers in Japan. One is a series of deregulation/liberalization policies in
the ﬁnancial sector that started in the early 1980s, and the other is the 1990s
recession.
Deregulation/liberalization policies contributed to thinning proﬁt mar-
gins, which used to be guaranteed by the government through ﬁnancially
repressive policies, and thereby intensifying market competitions for the ﬁ-
nancial institutions. The recession that started in 1991 hurt ﬁnancial insti-
tutions’ balance sheets through severe asset deﬂation and weakened loan
demand. Inevitably, in the early 1990s, merging with other institutions
started to be viewed as one of the means to survive the severe conditions in
the Japanese ﬁnancial industry. In the aftermath of the banking crisis of
1998, which broke out with several major bank failures, as the Japanese
banking industry became ﬂuid, so did the number of bank mergers drasti-
cally increase.
With this background, this chapter investigates a fundamental question
pertaining to banking consolidations in Japan: “What motivates banks to
decide to merge?” More speciﬁcally, the authors investigate whether banks
decide to merge so as (1) to increase market power; (2) to improve cost eﬃ-
ciency; (3) to merely follow government’s ﬁnancial stabilization policy; or
(4) to build a managerial empire. The authors categorize the ﬁrst two views
as the “value maximization view” because these two consequences can
lead to increasing the value of shares and the last two as the ﬁnancial sta-
bilization view and the managerial empire building view.1
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1. As Andy Rose pointed out at the presentation, I also agree that points one and two
should not be considered to be one view. Although both of the two points may lead to in-With these questions in mind, the authors conduct an empirical analysis
on what kind of premerger conditions motivate banks, either acquirers or
acquirees, to merge, and on what bank consolidations could do to the
merged banks in terms of cost eﬃciency, proﬁtability, and healthiness of
the ﬁnancial conditions.
There is no question that this chapter investigates an interesting ques-
tion. When bank mergers started becoming more commonplace in the late
1990s, many discussions arose both within the policy community and in the
general public about the eﬃcacy of bank consolidations. Many wondered
if bank mergers merely mean big amalgamations of feeble banks or the cre-
ation of slimmer and more eﬃcient banks. While there are very few studies
on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the Japanese banking industry—
simply because it is only recently that they started appearing in the Japan-
ese banking scene—this chapter nicely ﬁlls the void.
Using a sample of major banks, regional banks, and shinkin banks for
ﬁscal year 1990 to 2004 (ﬁscal year 1990 to 2001 for shinkins), the authors
ﬁnd empirical evidence as follows. As for the premerger determinants of
bank mergers, eﬃcient banks, among major and regional banks, but not
shinkin banks, tend to acquire ineﬃcient ones. The authors argue that this
result is in line with the value maximization view. They also ﬁnd that large,
but unhealthy regional or shinkin banks tend to acquire small and un-
healthy ones, which they believe is suggestive of the government’s stabi-
lization eﬀorts. As for the postmerger conditions, they ﬁnd that merged
banks tend to experience a short-term decline, but a long-term gain, in
their return on assets (ROA) in the aftermath of consolidations. Merged
banks also tend to raise loan rates, which they believe evidence that merged
banks exert more market power but also are more likely to fail to increase
the capital-to-asset ratio or to decrease the volume of nonperforming loans
(NPLs). They also ﬁnd that merged banks tend to experience loan growth.
This chapter presents an interesting set of results and adds important in-
formation to the debate on the eﬃcacy of bank consolidations in Japan. It
should help ﬁnancial administrators as well as bankers in Japan to self-
evaluate their policies. However, because of its potential policy implica-
tions, this chapter deserves careful scrutiny. Let me make three comments
on the estimation of the premerger determinants of bank mergers and one
on the postmerger estimation.
First, on the premerger estimation, the authors may need to be more care-
ful about theoretical interpretation of the estimation results. When empiri-
cal ﬁndings are analyzed, the authors often argue whether the estimated co-
eﬃcients are indicative of banks’ market-driven motivations (i.e., the “value
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creasing the value of shares, these points are about completely opposite issues in terms of the
competitiveness of market conditions. That is, while point one indicates an increasing mark-
up for a bank, that is, more gains from less-competitive market conditions, point two refers
to more-competitive conditions for the bank.maximization view”) or reﬂecting the government’s stabilization eﬀorts.
However, these two views are by no means mutually exclusive, especially in
the case of Japanese banking industry where, historically, the MOF has
heavily intervened with the industry. Although a series of deregulation/
liberalization policies and the creation of the Financial Services Agency
(FSA) have lessened the government’s meddling since the late 1990s, it is
still the case that bank consolidations in Japan are a function of what the
government or FSA thinks. In other words, political-economic factors play
an important role in banks’ decision makings about potential mergers re-
gardless of the type and size of the banks. Hence, the value maximization
view and the government stabilization view are not an either/or issue and,
therefore, the empirical results should not be interpreted one way or the
other. That said, from a diﬀerent angle, it may not be suﬃcient to have only
economic factors as explanatory variables for the estimation as the authors
have done. They may need to include some political variables to incorporate
the political-economic factors of the decision makings.
Second, the timing of the dependent and explanatory variables appears
to be questionable. To avoid bidirectional causality, the authors lag the ex-
planatory variables by one year. However, lagging the right-hand-side vari-
ables by one year may not capture appropriately the eﬀects of the determi-
nants of bank mergers. In other words, conditions in one year before a
merger may not properly reﬂect the motivations on the side of merging
banks. This concern arises due to the following two reasons. First, it usu-
ally takes a long time, possibly more than a year, for Japanese banks to im-
plement a merger after its announcement. Hence, in the year prior to a
merger, it is often the case that the merging banks are preparing and work-
ing toward the merger, not determining the merger. Therefore, the business
or economic conditions in one year prior do not represent as the determi-
nants of the merger. Second, using one-year lagged variables for the ex-
planatory variables may involve a risk of capturing moral hazard behavior.
That is, a bank that is to be acquired by a relatively healthy or bigger bank
may behave on contrary to the beneﬁt of the future shareholders of the
merged bank by taking unnecessarily risky investment. Especially, if a to-
be-acquired bank is riddled with severely weakened balance sheets, it may
as well take the long-bomb strategy—gamble on high-risk, high-return in-
vestment to improve balance sheets—because it has small net worth to lose
anyway. The U.S. savings and loan crisis witnessed such moral hazard
cases. One cannot rule out the possibility for Japanese mergers and acqui-
sitions. In this sense also, lagging the explanatory variables for one year
may not be appropriate to examine the motivations for Japanese banks’
mergers.
Last, on the premerger estimation, the results of the determinants of
bank mergers (shown in table 8.3) are generally not that signiﬁcant. The
weakness in the results is suspected to be due to multicollinearity. In the es-
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business, namely, cost performance, size, and healthiness of the banks, and
include several variables for each aspect as explanatory variables. For ex-
ample, the ROA and the cost ratios are included to capture the market eﬃ-
ciency levels of the banks, whereas the capital-to-asset ratio and the asset
growth rate are to capture their size. However, one can suspect that these
variables for each aspect of banking business are highly correlated. Fur-
thermore, these diﬀerent aspects of banking business can also be highly
correlated with each other. Either or both of cost performance and the op-
eration size of banks usually aﬀect the healthiness of the banks, or vice
versa. At the very least, the authors may need to be careful about the choice
of variables and avoid unnecessary multicollinearity.
Finally, on the postmerger estimation results, the authors ﬁnd that
merged banks tend to raise loan rates and interpret that as evidence that
merged banks strengthen their market power. However, this result can also
be interpreted as that newly merged banks tend to implement more strin-
gent risk management and, therefore, charge higher rates on their loans. It
has been discussed that a merger plan is often approved—implicitly or
explicitly—by the MOF or FSA with a condition that the new bank will
improve balance sheets and capital adequacy. If that is the case, it is not
surprising that a newly merged bank implement more stringent risk man-
agement and charge higher loan rates.
After all, this chapter can convey important messages to ﬁnancial ad-
ministrators and bankers. For that purpose, careful interpretation of the
empirical results and some reﬁnement in the model construction may be
necessary. It seems that the NPLs problem is ﬁnally history; as of the spring
of 2007, among the six major city banks, the ratio of NPLs to total loans is
around 1.5 percent, a signiﬁcant fall from 8 percent in 2002. As the NPL
problem is over, ﬂuidity in the banking industry may end as well. However,
given the current M&A boom and ample liquidity on the global scale, re-
structuring of Japanese banks may not end soon. Given that, the implica-
tions this chapter presents can be quite signiﬁcant.
Comment Barry Williams
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this chapter as it provides an insight
into the merger process in a country I do not make a focus of my research.
Thus I found the chapter both informative and interesting. I do have a few
comments to make that I feel can possibly improve the chapter.
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